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Abstract
The dynamic spatial general equilibrium model RHOMOLO with endogenous firm location
incorporates multiple sources of agglomeration and dispersion. Agglomeration is driven
mainly by increasing returns to scale and localised externalities; dispersion by costly trade
and imperfect competition. In RHOMOLO, three mechanisms interact in determining the
equilibrium spatial distribution of agents: capital mobility, labour mobility and vertical
linkages as captured by costly input-output trade. While households choose their location
based on real income differences, firms’ spatial equilibrium is determined by the inter-regional
equalisation of returns on capital. Illustrative simulation results suggest that in the EU
labour mobility has the tendency to magnify the home market effect and the market access
effect. In contrast, the market crowding effect seems to dominate the market access effect for
capital mobility and vertical linkages. These results are in line with the theoretical literature,
where the endogenous location mechanism of labour mobility contains two agglomeration
forces and one dispersion force, whereas the endogenous location mechanisms of capital
mobility and vertical linkages contain one agglomeration force and one dispersion force.
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1. Introduction
Modelling space in a micro-founded general equilibrium framework is a challenging task,
particularly if the focus is on the sub-national level. The first versions of the RHOMOLO
model (RHOMOLO v.1) (see for example Kancs, 2010; Gardiner and Kancs, 2011) were
developed using a neoclassical general equilibrium framework of a competitive economy a` la
Arrow and Debreu (1954), the essence of which lies on space-less and frictionless exchanges.
However, as the model grew to address new issues, such as the distribution of economic
activities and regional development, its structure evolved to embrace fundamental new
economic geography features.
As for the earlier versions of the model, it may be worth refreshing the memory of
the reader on the characteristics and properties of the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium
framework. In this basic framework, the economy is composed of a finite number of agents
(firms and households) and commodities (goods and services).1 A firm is characterised by
a production function, describing a possible technological combination between inputs and
outputs. A household is identified by a preference relation, an initial endowment, and a
portfolio of firms’ equities. The general equilibrium is described by an equilibrium system
of prices (one price for each input and output), equilibrium production level for each firm,
and equilibrium consumption level for each household satisfying the general equilibrium
conditions, where all markets clear and each agent chooses the action that maximises her
objective function at the equilibrium prices. In particular, (i) each firm maximises its profit
subject to the technological constraints; (ii) each household maximises its utility under the
budget constraint defined by the value of its initial endowment and its shares in firms’ profits;
and (iii) the supply and demand on each input and output market are balanced.
In line with such a canonical general equilibrium framework, in the first version of
RHOMOLO a commodity was defined only by its physical characteristics. From a spatial
perspective, a commodity could be defined also by the location where it is made available.
Hence, space could be introduced in the model by considering the same good in different
locations as two different economic objects entering agent decisions in a different way.
Therefore the same good can be supplied at different prices in different locations.
However, as noted by Eaton and Lipsey (1977), the neoclassical general equilibrium
approach of Arrow-Debreu with ubiquitous agents and homogeneous space fails to capture
the fundamental spatial features of economies, determining the agglomeration and dispersion
1Assuming that consumers (producers) are homogeneous in each region is equal to modelling a represen-
tative consumer (producer) per region.
1
of economic activities and production factors. In order to introduce space explicitly into
the modelling framework, RHOMOLO v.1 follows Eaton and Lipsey (1977) and relaxes two
assumptions of the canonical general equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu: the ubiquity of
agents and the homogeneity of space.
First, as for the assumption ubiquitous agents, in RHOMOLO v.1 a consumption (re-
spectively, production) pattern describes the quantities of goods consumed (respectively,
produced) in a specific location. Relaxing the ubiquity assumption of economic agents
has two implications for the spatial equilibrium. First, location choice does not affect the
characteristics of agents because, a priori, they have no preferences over the set of locations.
Second, the consumption or production choices made by agents vary with their location, as
the relative prices change with the supply and demand of each good in each location.
Second, following the models of comparative advantage, RHOMOLO v.1 introduces the
heterogeneity of space through differences in technology and endowment with production
factors. As in the model of Ricardo (1817), regions have different technologies, and tech-
nological advantages vary across sectors. Regions have the tendency to specialise in the
production of the good for which the relative opportunity cost is lower. As in the models of
Heckscher (1918) and Ohlin (1933), regions have different endowments in production factors
and the inter-regional immobility of production factors implies that the relative prices of
goods may differ. Inter-regional trade leads each region to specialise in the production of
goods that use the production factor it is relatively more endowed with.2
In summary, RHOMOLO v.1 provided a theoretically consistent micro-founded multi-
regional general equilibrium framework for studying the impacts of exogenous macro-economic
or policy shocks, but the location of economic agents (workers, firms, etc.) was exogenously
given. While the model was able to explain the specialisation patterns resulting from a
an exogenously determined economic geography, it could not explain the rise and fall of
agglomerations endogenously, which is a key issue for policy makers and local stakeholders.
As noted by Krugman (1991), an endogenous modelling of industry location requires: (i)
agglomeration and dispersion forces; and (ii) factor mobility to allow these forces to reshape
the economic geography. These elements constitute the main innovations of RHOMOLO v.2
and are described in the remainder of the paper.
2Among others, Epifani (2005) studies the interplay between factor abundance and agglomeration forces,
finding that if endowments are similar enough (i.e., if regions are not too dissimilar in terms of factor ratios),
the process of regional integration involves an overshooting of inter-regional specialisation and relative factor
prices with respect to the free trade level determined by factor abundance.
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2. The RHOMOLO v.2 model3
The domestic economy (which corresponds to the EU) consists of R − 1 regions r, q =
1, . . . , R− 1, which are included into M countries m = 1, . . . ,M , plus one region accounting
for the rest of the world, R. Each region is inhabited by Hr households which can be mobile
across, determining the size of regional markets.4 The income of households consists of labour
revenue (wages), capital revenue and government transfers. It is used to consume final goods,
pay taxes and save.
The final goods sector in the EU includes s = 1, . . . , S − 1 different economic sectors
in which Ns,r firms operate under monopolistic competition a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Sector S differs from domestic sectors in that it only has one variety which is exclusively
produced in region R. Formally, we have NS,r = 0 and Ns,R = 0 for all r and s; and
NS,R = 1. The foreign variety of final good is used as the nume´raire. Each EU firm produces
imperfectly substitutable varieties of goods (which coincides with a sectors) that are consumed
by households or used by other firms as intermediate inputs or as investment goods. The
number of firms in sector s and region r is denoted by Ns,r is large enough so that strategic
interactions between firms are ruled out. The number of firms in each region is either set
exogenously or endogenised to influence the spatial distribution of economic activity.
Trade between (and within) regions is costly, implying that the shipping of goods between
(and within) regions entails transport costs which are assumed to be of the iceberg type,
with τs,r,q > 1 representing the quantity of sector’s s goods which needs to be sent from
region r in order to have one unit arriving in region q (see Krugman, 1991, for instance).
Transport costs are assumed to be sector- and region-pair-specific. They are related to the
distance separating regions r and q but can also depend on other factors, such as transport
infrastructure or national borders. Note that transport costs can be asymmetric (i.e. the
cost of shipping a good s from region r to q τs,r,q may differ from the cost of sending it back,
τs,q,r). They are also assumed to be positive within a given region (i.e. τs,r,r 6= 1) which
captures, among others, the distance between customers and firms within the region.
Finally, in each country there is a public sector which levies taxes on consumption and on
the income of local households. It provides public goods in the form of public capital which
is necessary for the operation of firms. It also subsidises the private sector, including the
3See Brandsma et al. (2013) for a formal description of the model.
4Labour mobility is introduced through a labour market module which extends this core version of the
model with a more sophisticated specification of the labour market. This is described in Brandsma et al.
(2014b).
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production of R&D and innovation, and influences the capacity of the educational system to
produce human capital with public consumption.
The detailed regional dimension and inter-regional flows of RHOMOLO imply that the
number of (non-linear) equations to be solved simultaneously is relatively high. Therefore, in
order to keep the model manageable from a computation point of view, its dynamics are
kept relatively simple. Three types of factors (physical capital, human capital and knowledge
capital) as well as three types of assets (equities, domestic government bonds and foreign
bonds) are accumulated over time. Agents are assumed to save a constant fraction of their
income in each period and form their expectations based only on the current and past states
of the economy. The dynamics of the model is then described as in a standard Solow model,
i.e. a sequence of short-run equilibria that are related to each other through the build-up of
physical and human capital stocks.
RHOMOLO contains several endogenous agglomeration and dispersion forces affecting
the location choices of firms (see Brandsma et al., 2013, for a formal description of en-
dogenous location in RHOMOLO). Three mechanisms drive the endogenous agglomeration
and dispersion of economic agents in RHOMOLO: the market access effect, the price index
effect and the market crowding effect. The market access effect captures the fact that firms
located in markets with many consumers or next to them can make higher profits by avoiding
high transport costs, thus benefitting large/central regions. The price index effect captures
the impact of firms’ location and trade costs on the cost of living of workers, and cost
of intermediate inputs for producers of final demand goods. The market crowding effect
captures the fact that having many competitors not facing high transport costs in the market
has a negative impact on the market shares of firms, for a given level of income and total
consumption, thus creating the incentives for firms to locate in peripheral regions with few
competitors.
RHOMOLO contains three endogenous location mechanisms that bring the agglomeration
and dispersion of firms and workers about: the mobility of capital, the mobility of labour,
and vertical linkages. Following the mobile capital framework of Martin and Rogers (1995),
we assume that (i) capital is mobile between regions; and (ii) the mobile capital repatriates
all of its earnings to the households in its region of origin. Following the mobile labour
framework of Krugman (1991), we assume that workers are spatially mobile (though the
mobility is not perfect); mobile workers not only produce in the region where they settle
(as the mobile capital does), but they also spend their income there (which is not the case
with capital owners); workers’ migration is governed by differences in the expected income,
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and differences in the costs of living between regions (the mobility of capital is driven solely
by differences in the nominal rates of return).5 Following the vertical linkage framework of
Venables (1996), we assume that, in addition to the primary factors, firms use intermediate
inputs in the production process; similarly to final goods consumers, firms value the variety
of intermediate inputs; trade of intermediate inputs is costly.
3. Data and empirical implementation
3.1. Dimensions of RHOMOLO
RHOMOLO covers 267 NUTS2 regions in EU27,6 which are disaggregated into 6 NACE
Rev. 1.1 sectors (see Table 1 and Figure 1, respectively). The detailed regional and
sectoral disaggregation imposes significant data requirements. In particular, the empirical
implementation of the RHOMOLO model requires data for all exogenous and endogenous
variables at regional (and sectoral) level for the base year (2007), and numerical values for
behavioural parameters.
Table 1: Sectoral disaggregation of the RHOMOLO model
Code Sector description
AB Agriculture, hunting and forestry
CDE Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity and gas
F Construction
GHI Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, personal
and household goods, hotels and restaurants, transport and communications
JK Financial intermediation, real estate and business services
LMNOP Non-market services
Source: Authors’ aggregation based on the EUROSTAT (2003) NACE Rev. 1.1 classification.
The base year (2007) data are compiled in the form of an inter-regional Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) (see Potters et al., 2014, for details). For the construction of all EU27 countries’
SAMs, the recently published data of the EU funded World Input Output Database (WIOD)
project have been used. The WIOD database provides International Input-Output tables,
International and National Supply and Use tables, National Input-Output tables, and Socio-
Economic and Environmental Accounts covering all EU27 countries and 13 other major
5In the model also the regional unemployment rates enter the migration problem of workers.
6Croatian regions have not been introduced yet for lack of data at the regional level n the model calibration
years.
5
regions in the world for the period from 1995 to 2009. An important advantage of the WIOD
data is that re-exports are subtracted from the direct exports to calculate the final value of
exports. Generally, the WIOD data are available for 59 NACE Rev. 1.1 sectors, which for the
purpose of the present study are aggregated into the six macro-sectors used in RHOMOLO.
The aggregated SAMs are constructed at the national level – based on the Supply and Use
tables, and regionalised by taking into account constraints, such as, regional data on value
added, employment and other regional and sectoral information from EUROSTAT.
AT (9) BE (11) BG (6)
CY (1) CZ (8) DE (39)
DK (5) EE (1) ES (18)
FI (5) FR (22) GR (13)
HU (7) IE (2) IT (21)
LT (1) LU (1) LV (1)
MT (1) NL (12) PL (16)
PT (5) RO (8) SE (8)
SI (2) SK (4) UK (37)
Countries and regions in RHOMOLO
Figure 1: Spatial disaggregation of the RHOMOLO model. Notes: The number of NUTS2 regions in each
country are in parentheses.
3.2. Data for inter-regional variables
Inter-regional labour migration is captured in RHOMOLO as net changes in the regional
labour force (see Brandsma et al., 2014b, for details). The net aggregate relocation of workers
between any two regions is a function of expected income and distance – which requires data for
labour migration, regional GDP and unemployment and migration elasticities. EUROSTAT’s
Regional Migration Statistics dataset provides data on within country migration. The
key statistics on migration in OECD countries provides data on international migration.
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The Household Income and Active Population data is also extracted from EUROSTAT.
Together with data on regional/sector unemployment and wages – micro-estimated based on
EUROSTAT’s labour force survey – this information provided the necessary input to the
analysis of labour market and migration features in RHOMOLO model.
Inter-regional trade flows are estimated using inter-regional transport-based data from
the Thissen et al. (2013). This data is brought in line with the available macro-constraints:
the distribution of production and consumption over the EU regions and the national SAMs
to ensure consistency with the rest of RHOMOLO’s data. For the construction of regional
production and consumption constraints, data from the fully consistent regional SAMs were
taken. Inter-regional trade costs come from the TRANSTOOLS database, which add up to
the country level trade flows from the COMEXT international trade statistics.
3.3. Data for inter-temporal variables
Knowledge capital enters RHOMOLO through region-sector-specific R&D intensities
(innovation expenditures, normalised by GDP), which are available at the national and
regional level from the EUROSTAT’s Science and Technology Indicators database. Whereas
R&D data by sector are available at the national level, comparable data are not available at
the regional level for most of the countries. In order to regionalise the national R&D data by
sector, we use the EUROSTAT’s database, which distinguishes four sectors of performance –
namely governments, higher education institutions, business sector and private non-profit
organisations (note that these do not correspond to the six sectors in RHOMOLO). Given
the sectoral aggregation adopted in RHOMOLO (see Table 1), most of these sectors fall
under the broader business sector. In a second step, we correct for the sectoral disaggregation
by using the regional gross fixed capital formation by NACE sector. In this way we are able
to construct the best available proxy for NACE sector R&D spending at the regional level –
given the current availability of data.7
The regional stock of human capital is approximated in RHOMOLO by 3 different levels
of education: low skill (isced0 2), medium-skill (isced3 4), and high skill (isced5 6). Wages
are differentiated on basis of the education levels in order to internalise the investment
decision of the households on the amount of education to be invested in each period. Data
7Currently undergoing extension of the innovation module in RHOMOLO with additional features beyond
R&D includes two elements. First, European Commission-based regional patent statistics and citations
offer valuable information on technological proximity across regions in Europe. Second, the inclusion of the
micro-estimated data from the Community Innovation Survey is used to identify a broader set of regional
innovation features – closely related to the policy domains identified in the current taxonomy of cohesion
policy investments.
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for this come from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the EU KLEMS database. The wage
rate enters the relevant equations as income deciles.
The regional stock of physical capital data are constructed according to the Perpetual
Inventory Method (PIM), because comparable data for all EU27 countries on capital stock
at the regional/sectoral level of disaggregation are not available. This approach takes the
initial stock by country and industry (regionalised by GVA share) in the year 1995 and
calculates the final capital stock by region and by industry in 2007 by adding the yearly
capital investments and depreciating the existing stock every year. For implementing this
approach we used the following data: gross fixed capital formation on NUTS 2 level and by
sector in current prices for the years 1995-2007; price deflators for converting into constant
prices; initial stocks for calculating the net capital stocks for each year applying the PIM from
the EU KLEMS database. These data are available at the national level and regionalised by
the GVA share; depreciation rates are calculated by weighing the average service life of each
of the six types of assets for each country, using the EAS95 classification.
3.4. Model parameters
In order to parameterise the RHOMOLO model, most of the underlying structural
parameters are estimated econometrically, others, in particular the behavioural parameters,
are drawn from the literature (Okagawa and Ban, 2008). The remaining part of RHOMOLO
parameters is calibrated within the model.
All key structural parameters in RHOMOLO are estimated econometrically. In particular,
all parameters related to the wage curve and inter-regional labour migration are estimated in
a panel data setting for each country (Brandsma et al., 2014b; Persyn et al., 2014). Second,
all parameters related to the elasticities of substitution both on consumer and producer
sides are taken from the literature. In the current version of RHOMOLO, the implemented
elasticities of substitution are uniform for all sectors and regions. However, in future versions
of RHOMOLO, they will be estimated by sector and region based on micro-data.
Finally, as usual in CGE models, all shift and share parameters are calibrated to reproduce
the base year (2007) data in the SAMs. In order to determine the sensitivity of simulation
results with respect to the implemented parameters in RHOMOLO, we perform extensive
sensitivity analysis and robustness checks. Among others, the sensitivity analysis allows us to
establish confidence intervals (in addition to the simulated point estimates) for RHOMOLO’s
simulation results.
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4. Agglomeration and dispersion
As noted by Krugman (1991), an endogenous modelling of industry location requires: (i)
agglomeration and dispersion forces; and (ii) mechanism(s) based on which the agglomera-
tion/dispersion are brought about. The theoretical literature identifies a considerable amount
of potential agglomeration and dispersion forces (for surveys see Fujita et al. (1999); Fujita
and Thisse (2002); Baldwin et al. (2003)). In the structure of RHOMOLO v.2 it is possible
to identify two standard agglomeration forces (increasing returns to scale and localised
externalities), and two relevant dispersion forces (trade costs and imperfect competition).
These forces are captured in the model through three effects, running through market access,
the price index and market crowding.
4.1. Agglomeration forces and effects
Here follows a discussion on the two agglomeration forces, increasing returns to scale and
localised externalities, followed by a description of the effects associated with these forces,
the market access effect and the price index effect.
4.1.1. Agglomeration forces
Increasing returns to scale. As noted by Koopmans (1957), without recognising the
indivisibilities in human capital, residences, plants, equipment, and transportation, location
problems cannot be fully understood. More generally, when studying location issues, it is
important to understand to what extent increasing returns are at work, which is tantamount
to indivisibilities of economic activities. Starrett (1978) has shown that, if production
activities could be divided up to the point where trade costs are zero without any loss of
efficiency, the absence of scale economies would turn each location into an autarky. On the
one hand, in absence of fixed production costs, a sufficient number of firms could be located
in each location of consumption. As a result, there would be no trade between locations.
On the other hand, in absence of trade costs, a single location of firms would be enough to
satisfy the entire demand of all locations (except for the case where the marginal cost of
production would increase). As a result, each agent would prefer a self-subsistence economy,
which Eaton and Lipsey (1977) refer to as a backyard capitalism.
In reality, however, neither trade costs are zero, nor goods are infinitely divisible. Hence,
both trade costs and increasing returns to scale are fundamental to understand the location
problems of economic activities, as they are among the most important determinants in the
9
firm and worker location decisions.8
In RHOMOLO v.2 increasing returns to scale are introduced via fixed costs, FCi,s,r, in
the firm value added production function (which is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form).
We assume that a fixed amount of resources in the form of equity, FCi,s,r, is needed to set
up firms. This is financed by households’ savings, which are free to be allocated to any EU
region (the extent of these flows can be can be drawn directly from the Social Accounting
Matrices, SAMs). Fixed costs are measured in quantity terms, and firms pay them at the
beginning of each period (before starting to produce market output).
Localised externalities. Marshall (1890) has discussed how local interactions between
firms and workers (knowledge spillovers, business communications, and social interactions)
constitute an important source of agglomeration. The so-called Marshallian economies
describe the advantages generated by the clustering of economic activities in space. Marshall
distinguishes between three sources of external economies: (i) the distribution of specialised
inputs, whose unit cost is low, when demand for that input is sufficiently high; (ii) large local
labour market offering improved matching between jobs and workers, thus making both firms
and workers more productive; and (iii) the more intense circulation of ideas and knowledge
spillover effects, which also increases firm and worker productivity.
According to Scitovsky (1954), two types of external effects can be distinguished: tech-
nological externalities and pecuniary externalities. Whereas the former (Marshallian) are
restricted to spillovers directly affecting individual utility or firms’ production functions, the
latter result from market interactions and affect firms or consumers/workers by means of
exchanges. If competition is imperfect, pecuniary externalities may arise due to the fact that
prices do not reflect the social value of individual decisions. Consequently, when agents move,
they do not account for all the effects caused by their decisions. To put it another way, the
move of an agent unintentionally affects the welfare of all other agents through pecuniary
externalities.
In RHOMOLO v.2 localised externalities enter through the stock of public capital, KGr ,
in the value added production function and through spillovers. Localised externalities are
region-specific, they determine the relationship between the density of workers and firms in
8In the presence of increasing returns, the resources available in the economy impose a limit on the number
of firms and varieties capable of being produced. In general, this number depends on the entry barriers that
firms face. In the framework of Chamberlin (1890), the fixed cost associated with firm entry / the launching
of a new variety is the only effective barrier. Such an entry barrier is nonstrategic, because it cannot be
manipulated by other firms.
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a region, and the productivity of particular inputs in the regions’ value added production
function (specialised inputs, capital and labour).9
4.1.2. Agglomeration effects
Market access effect. The so-called market access effect, which in the literature is also
referred to as the dominant market effect, demand linkage or backward linkage (Fujita et al.,
1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Baldwin et al., 2003), results from differences in proximity to
costumers (consumers and other firms) across regions. It explains why large/central regions
tend to have more firms and production than small/peripheral regions. Of course, market
access does not depend only on the size of the region in itself, but also to its position vis-a`-vis
the other large regions and the cost of shipping goods to the other markets (which is why
high trade costs are a dispersion force).
Indeed, there are two reasons for the concentration of production in large/central regions.
First, due to positive trade costs, the demand for a region’s output increases with it’s
relative accessibility and the economic size of the region. This can be seen by combining the
consumption and profit equations:
pii,s,r︸ ︷︷ ︸
profits
= pi,s,r︸︷︷︸
output price
·

(
1
βs
τs,r,qpi,s,r
) 1
σ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CIF price for variety
(
P cq
)σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
price index
Iq︸︷︷︸
income

− P yi,s,rXi,s,r︸ ︷︷ ︸
value added costs
−
S∑
u=1
au−1s P
u
r Xi,s,r︸ ︷︷ ︸
intermediate inputs
− P yi,s,r FCi,s,r︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed costs
(1)
where pii,s,r is profit of firm i located in region r operating in sector s, P
c
q and P
u
isr are
the consumer price index and the intermediate input price index, respectively, pi,s,r is the
price of variety i of sector s produced in regions r, βs is the weight given to sector s in
the household’s (firm ’s) preferences, τs,r,q is trade cost from region r to region q, σ is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties, P yi,s,r is the price of value added, Xi,s,r is a CES
aggregate over final (intermediate) good varieties, as are technical input coefficients in the
9Externalities are also modelled through technological spillovers, Dφm. As noted in section 2, the production
of ideas requires only the use of high skill labour as a remunerated input, LhiR&D,m, but this input is augmented
by the available stock of knowledge, Dφm, in country m. Given that these spillovers operate at the national
level, strictly taken, they are not localised externalities.
11
Leontief production function, Iq is disposable household income in region q, and as above
FCi,s,r is fixed cost. According to profit function (1), the total demand, Xi,s,r, for good i in
sector s produced in region r, and hence profit, piisr , is increasing with lower trade costs, τr,q,
and with elasticity of substitution, σ. The weighted average trade costs can be lower either
due to large internal market (because τrr < τrq ∀ r, q), or due to central location of a region
(good accessibility), or both.
Second, the profitability of firms is further enhanced by increasing returns, since growth
in their output reduces the average production costs. By combining the production function,
the value added and the profit equations, one can see that, if everything else would stay
constant (including the fixed cost, FCi,s,r), then an increase in output, Xi,s,r, would reduce
the share of fixed costs, FCi,s,r, in average costs, and hence increase firm profits, piisr .
Price index effect. The so-called price index effect, which in the literature is also known
as the cost-of-living effect, cost linkage or forward linkage (Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and
Thisse, 2002; Baldwin et al., 2003), describes the impact of firm location and trade costs
on the cost of living of workers, and the cost of intermediate inputs for producers of the
final demand goods. Given that consumers in large/central regions with more firms have to
import a narrower range of products, reducing in such a way trade costs, goods tend to be
less expensive in large/central regions than in small/peripheral regions. This can be seen in
the consumer price index (2), and the intermediate input price index (3), respectively:
P cq︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer price index
=
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
βσs (τs,r,qpi,s,r)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CES aggregation across final demand good varieties
(2)
P uisr︸ ︷︷ ︸
intermediate input price index
=
 R∑
q=1
Nuq∑
j=1
βσs
(
τr,qp
u
j,q
)1−σ 11−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CES aggregation across intermediate good varieties
(3)
where P cq and P
u
isr are the consumer price index and the intermediate input price index,
respectively, pi,s,r is the price of variety i in sector s produced in regions r, βs is the weight
given to sector s in the household’s (firm ’s) preferences, τs,r,q is trade cost from region r to
region q, pj,u,q is the price of variety j, u, q of final goods, and σ is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties.
Both price indices suggest that the total trade costs in each sector,
∑R
r=1(τr,q − 1)pr,q,
and hence the cost of living and producing, are lower in large/central regions. The regional
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price index increases in trade costs. Because of lower costs of living/production, firms
(purchasing intermediate inputs) and consumers (purchasing final goods) would prefer to
locate in large/central regions.
In the absence of dispersion forces, the described price index effect could become self-
sustained in the sense that the availability of more locally produced varieties lowers the
regional price index, lowers prices in the region and, in turn, attracts more firms and workers.
4.2. Dispersion forces and effects
Here follows a discussion on the two dispersion forces, trade costs and imperfect com-
petition, followed by a description of the effect associated with these forces, the market
crowding.
4.2.1. Dispersion forces
Trade costs. In spatial economics it has been recognised for a long time that accessibility
drives the location of economic agents to spatially dispersed markets Bosker and Garretsen
(2010). Losch (1940) has shown that, when trade costs increase with distance, which formally
is equivalent to the case in which a fixed cost coexists with a growing marginal cost, each
production unit would supply consumers located within a certain radius, the length of which
depends on the relative level of trade costs and the intensity of increasing returns.
The accessibility of a location is determined by two components: its spatial location
and transportation costs. Whereas the former is exogenous and fixed, the latter can be
changed by policy makers, which explains the large interest that trade costs have triggered
in the economic literature. Trade costs capture all the costs generated by the various types
of spatial frictions that economic agents face in a spatial exchange process. According to
Bairoch (1974) and Spulber (2011), there are four key components of trade costs: (i) spatial
transaction costs that result from doing business at a distance due to differences in consumer
tastes, business practices, as well as political and legal institutions; (ii) tariff and non-tariff
barriers, such as different environmental standards, anti-dumping practices, and the different
market regulations that restrict trade and investment between regions and countries; (iii)
transportation costs per se, as goods have to be transported from their production place to
their consumption place, while many services remain non-tradable or can be transported at
a comparably low cost; and (iv) time costs as, despite significant advances in communication
technologies during the last decades, there are still important communication impediments
across dispersed distribution of producers and consumers that slow down reactions to changes
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in market conditions, while the time needed to ship certain types of goods or access certain
types of services has an increasing value.
In RHOMOLO v.2 trade between (and within) regions is assumed to be costly, implying
that the shipment of goods between (and within) regions entails transport costs, which are
assumed to be of the iceberg type, with τs,r,q > 1 representing the quantity of sector’s s
goods which needs to be sent from region r in order to have one unit arriving in region q.
Higher trade costs make it more difficult for firms to serve distant markets and thus represent
a strong dispersion force.
Imperfect competition. Imperfect competition implies that firms do not consider prices as
given but are price-makers. Given that the level of prices depends on the spatial distribution
of firms and consumers, the resulting interdependence between firms and workers may yield
agglomerations. Two types of imperfect competition have been used in economic models:
monopolistic competition and oligopolistic competition. Whereas monopolistic competition
involves a modest departure from the competitive framework by allowing firms to be price-
makers by producing differentiated goods under increasing returns, oligopolistic competition
involves a small number of large agents that interact strategically. Due to its convenience in
terms of modelling, we follow the framework of monopolistic competition in RHOMOLO v.2.
The concept of monopolistic competition goes back to Chamberlin (1890), it can be
described by means of the following six assumptions: (i) differentiated products, (ii) a high
number of firms of negligible size, (iii) free entry and exit in the market, (iv) independent
decision making, (v) market power, and (vi) imperfect information.10 Chamberlin’s ideas
were formalised by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), who brought them into
applied economic modelling by proposing a simple and analytically tractable framework
of general equilibrium with monopolistic competition, as opposed to Spence (1976), who
developed them in a partial-equilibrium setting.
In RHOMOLO v.2 imperfect competition is modelled in the monopolistic competition
framework of Dixit–Stiglitz, as it makes it possible to integrate both increasing returns
and imperfect competition in a tractable and elegant way. First, we assume that each
firm produces a differentiated product (variety), which are not perfect substitutes. In the
10These assumptions bear a strong resemblance with those of perfect competition, the main difference
being in the fact that in monopolistic competition each firm sells a specific product and chooses its own price.
This endows each firm with a specific market, in which the firm has some monopoly power. However, the
existence of similar varieties implies that the size of this market depends on the behaviour of other firms,
thus constraining each producer in their price choice. Hence, a monopolistically competitive firm is neither
in a situation of perfect competition, not in a situation of ’pure’ monopoly.
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same time, we assume that the real or perceived non-price differences are small enough to
eliminate other varieties as substitutes. Product differentiation is captured by the elasticity of
substitution between varieties, σ, which is larger than one, but smaller than infinity. Second,
we assume that there is free entry and exit on each market, implying that firm profits are
zero in the long run. Third, the number of firms, Ns,r, operating in industry s located in
region r is sufficiently large, such that each of them is negligible with respect to the total
number of firms. This is ensured by the choice of fixed cost, FCi,s,r, and the elasticity of
substitution, σ.
4.2.2. Dispersion effect
Market crowding effect. The so-called market crowding effect, which in the literature
is also referred to as the competition effect (Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002;
Baldwin et al., 2003), reflects the fact that, because of higher competition on input and
output markets, firms prefer to locate in small/peripheral regions with fewer competitors.
As firms set up in large/central regions, competition between firms intensifies. When the
number of firms in large/central regions increases, the consumption of differentiated goods is
fragmented over a larger number of varieties (firms), implying that each firm’s output and
profit decrease. Given that the entry of new firms has a negative effect on profitability of
incumbents in more crowded regions, the competition effect works against the tendency to
agglomerate.
The impact of the market crowding effect on output can be seen in equation (4):
XCh,q︸ ︷︷ ︸
total demand
=
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
βs
Ns,r∑
i=1
(
xi,s,rh,q
)θ) 1θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CES aggregation of consumption across firms
(4)
where xi,s,rh,q is the demand of variety i of sector s produced in regions r from household h
located in region q, βs is the weight given to sector s in the household’s (firm ’s) preferences.
For a given level of total consumption, function (4) shows that the demand for xi,s,rh,q , the
output produced by firm i in sector s in region r decreases in the sales of competitors in
region q. In (4) this can be seen by holding the total demand, XCh,q, fixed. If Ns,r increases,
then xi,s,rh,q must decrease, everything else constant. Lower output, and hence profits, would
induce firms to move away from large/central regions to small/peripheral regions with fewer
competitors.
The market crowding effect also affects input markets through prices of spatially immobile
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(semi-mobile in the short-run) production factors. Agglomeration of firms in large/central
regions would bid up prices for immobile (semi-mobile) production factors, making production
more costly, which would reduce firm profits.
5. Mechanisms of agglomeration and dispersion
5.1. Setup
The agglomeration and dispersion forces determine the location choices of economic
agents in RHOMOLO through the effects detailed in the previous section. However, because
of factor mobility, vertical integration of markets, and other endogenous location mechanisms,
the optimal location choice of an agent affects the decisions of all other agents with which it
interacts, which may create self-reinforcing circular causality effects. This section introduces
such endogenous location mechanisms bringing the agglomeration and dispersion of economic
activity about in RHOMOLO v.2: capital mobility, the labour mobility, and vertical linkages.
In order to illustrate their impact on location choices of economic agents in RHOMOLO
v.2, we perform numerical simulations on the example of regional market integration in the
EU.11 In particular, we reduce trade costs between EU regions in line with the approved
transport infrastructure investments of the EU Cohesion Policy (ECP) for the financial
programming period 2014-2020 (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Trade costs are of particular
interest for studying location decisions of economic agents because they are inherent attributes
of exchanges across space and play an important role in spatial transactions (Anas et al.,
1998).
According to the second column in Table 2 in the Appendix, there are large inter-regional
differences in the ECP expenditure on infrastructure ranging from few million EUR to
several billion EUR per region. In line with the overall objectives of the ECP, the largest
amounts are allocated to the Less Developed Regions. The third column in Table 2 shows the
estimated accessibility improvements, the distribution of which is similar to the pattern of
ECP expenditures on transport infrastructure.12 We expect that agglomeration mechanisms
will be more pronounced in the Less Developed Regions, where the trade cost reductions are
the largest.
11Note that we can only run simulations to show the impact of capital mobility because, due to the
complexity of the model, analytical derivations are not possible.
12The methodology is illustrated in detail in Brandsma et al. (2014a).
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5.2. Mobility of capital
The canonical framework featuring the home market effect was proposed by Krugman
(1980), where the location of economic activities is driven by firm creation/destruction.
Martin and Rogers (1995) extended the framework of Krugman (1980), by assuming that
capital is mobile, just as goods are, which allows to study the impact of the economic size and
accessibility of a region on the spatial distribution of economic activity. As noted by Krugman
(1980), both market size is one of the key determinants of firms’ location choices, and regions’
accessibility to other markets is a crucial element in determining the attractiveness of a
region.
Following the mobile capital framework of Martin and Rogers (1995), we make two
assumptions in order to implement capital mobility in RHOMOLO v.2: (i) capital is mobile
between regions; and (ii) the mobile capital repatriates all of its earnings to its region of
origin.
In order to illustrate the impact of capital mobility on location choices of economic agents,
we perform numerical simulations of trade cost reduction. In addition to the base run, we
solve the model for two scenarios: one with capital mobility and one without capital mobility.
The two other mechanisms of endogenous location (labour mobility and vertical linkages) are
excluded from this exercise. The results on regional GDP are reported in Figure 2, which
shows percentage changes of GDP compared to the baseline.
Comparing the left map with the right map in Figure 2, we can see that differences in
the policy impact between regions decrease substantially, when capital mobility is allowed
for in the model. Whereas the standard deviation of the simulated policy impact is 1.005
(left map) without capital mobility, it decreases to 0.703 when we introduce capital mobility
between regions (right map). Also the amplitude of the simulated policy impact across
regions decreases (the minimum value increases from -0.22% to 0.06% of GDP, and the
maximum value decreases from 4.57% to 3.41% of GDP. Hence, our results suggest that, by
equalising the returns to capital, capital mobility has the tendency to spread the positive
growth impact from regions with the highest intervention to other regions in the EU.
Notice that the adopted capital mobility (Martin and Rogers, 1995) contains two effects
that affect firm location decisions: market access effect and market crowding effect. The
relative strength of the two effects determines the degree of agglomeration of mobile firms,
which may magnify or dwarf the initial size advantage of large/central regions (in the
literature, this effect is known as the home market effect, and goes back to Corden (1970)).
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Figure 2: Simulated impact of cohesion policy investment in transport infrastructure on real GDP in 2050,
percentage changes from the baseline. Left panel: immobile capital; right panel: mobile capital.
5.3. Mobility of labour
Krugman (1991) proposed a framework where the mobility of labour force bring the
agglomeration/dispersion about. In addition to the market access effect and market crowding
effect, in the mobile labour framework also the cost-of-living effect plays an important role in
location decisions of firms and workers.
Following the mobile labour framework of Krugman (1991), we make three assumptions
in order to implement labour mobility in RHOMOLO v.2.13 First, we assume that workers
are spatially mobile (though the mobility is not perfect). Second, mobile workers not only
produce in the region where they settle (as the mobile capital does), but they also spend
their income there (which is not the case with capital owners). Third, workers’ migration is
governed by expected differences in real income, therefore differences in the costs of living
between regions matter (the mobility of capital is driven solely by differences in the nominal
rates of return).
Formally, the simulated workforce change in region r with labour force Lr due to migration
13See Brandsma et al. (2014b) for a detailed description of labour migration in RHOMOLO.
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is difference between the incoming and outgoing migration, or∑
o
Lo · sor −
∑
d
Lr · srd (5)
where sor is the share of migrants from o to r, and soo is the share of stayers in region o.
In order to illustrate the impact of labour mobility on spatial distribution of economic
activity, as above, we perform numerical simulations of trade cost reduction. In addition to
the base run, we solve the model for two scenarios: one with labour mobility and one without
capital mobility. The two other mechanisms of endogenous location (capital mobility and
vertical linkages) are excluded from this exercise. The results on regional GDP are reported
in Figure 3, which maps percentage changes in regions’ GDP compared to the baseline.
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Figure 3: Simulated impact of cohesion policy investment in transport infrastructure on real GDP in 2050,
percentage changes from the baseline. Left panel: immobile labour; right panel: mobile labour.
The simulation results reported in Figure 3 suggest that differences in the policy impact
between regions increase substantially, when labour mobility is allowed for in the model.
Comparing the left map with the right map in Figure 3, we can see that light-coloured
regions become lighter, whereas the dark-coloured regions have become even darker, implying
that labour mobility in RHOMOLO magnifies the increase of labour force, local demand and
economic activity in those regions benefitting the most from improved accessibility due to
transport infrastructure investments.
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These results are not surprising in light of the underlying theoretical framework of mobile
labour, which contains one additional agglomeration force, compared to the above discussed
mobile capital framework. When mobile workers migrate between regions, they spend their
income in the destination region, where the final demand increases, while it decreases in
the origin region. An increase in the market size tends to increase firm profits, and attracts
firms in regions with improved accessibility vis-a-vis other regions. This in turn triggers two
further effects in RHOMOLO v.2. On the one hand, a concentration of firms makes a given
nominal wage in regions with improved accessibility more attractive (in real terms) than
the same wage in other regions, because of lower weighted average trade costs (cost-of-living
effect). Hence, the cost-of-living effect may stimulate further migration. On the other hand,
the concentration of firms in regions with improved accessibility increases the competition
for local inputs and customers, while it reduces the competition in other regions. As in
the mobile capital framework, the market crowding effect implies that firms in regions with
improved accessibility would have the tendency to pay a lower nominal wage in order to
break even, while the opposite takes place in other regions. For a given cost-of-living, the
market crowding effect makes regions with improved accessibility less attractive to workers.
The simulation results reported in Figure 3 suggest that the two agglomeration effects
(market access and cost-of-living) are stronger than the dispersion effect (market crowding),
because labour migration triggers additional agglomeration of workers and firms, resulting
in more mobile workers and firms located in those regions, which benefit from improved
accessibility the most. Our simulation results also suggest that workers’ migration seems to
be self-correcting, as the dispersion effect becomes stronger at higher levels of agglomeration.
Because of partially immobile demand and production factors, the entire workforce does
not end up agglomerated in few central EU regions. Consider also that, since varieties are
imperfectly substitutable, goods produced in peripheral regions always have a certain demand
to satisfy and if too many productive factors moved away from the region, the effect on prices
and quantities would be such to make it appealing again for firms and workers to move to
the periphery.
5.4. Vertical linkages
It is well known that the final demand for consumer goods only accounts for a part of
firms’ sales, the rest being demand for intermediate goods. The share of intermediate inputs
in the total world trade is gaining in importance over time (Venables and Limao, 2002). An
alternative mechanism for driving the endogenous location decision of economic agents can
thus be based on the vertical-linkage framework of Venables (1996), who shows how spatial
20
agglomeration/dispersion of economic activities can emerge due to input-output linkages in
vertically integrated markets. When making their location choices, the intermediate goods
producers consider where the final goods producers are located, and the final goods producers
will likely choose their location close to the intermediate goods suppliers.
Following the vertical-linkage framework of Venables (1996), we make three assumptions in
order to implement vertical linkages in RHOMOLO v.2. First, we assume that, in additional
to primary factors, firms use intermediate inputs in the production process. Second, similarly
to final goods consumers, firms value the variety of intermediate inputs. Third, the trade of
intermediate inputs is costly.
Because of improved market access, firms of the final goods sector tend to move to regions
with improved accessibility vis-a-vis other regions. Higher demand for intermediate goods
in regions with improved accessibility attracts producers of intermediate goods from other
regions. Due to lower average trade costs, these intermediate goods can be supplied at a
lower cost in regions with improved accessibility (price index effect), triggering more firms
of the final goods sector to move to regions with improved accessibility. Such a cumulative
causation process can reinforce itself, so that the resulting agglomeration can be driven solely
by the demand for intermediate goods.
On the other hand, an increase in the wage level (if not offset by an increase in immigration
of labour force) implies higher labour costs (market crowding effect), which lies at the heart
of many debates regarding the deindustrialisation of developed countries. In such a context,
firms from regions with improved accessibility may be induced to relocate their activities to
other regions, where lower wages more than offset lower demand.
In order to illustrate the impact of vertical linkages on location choices of economic
agents, we perform numerical simulations of trade cost reduction in RHOMOLO. As above,
we simulate the trade cost reduction scenario under two alternative assumptions: one with
vertical-linkages and one without vertical-linkages, excluding the two other mechanisms of
endogenous location for clarity. The results on regional GDP are reported in Figure 4, which
shows percentage changes of GDP compared to the baseline.
Similar to capital mobility, comparing the left map with the right map in Figure 4, we
can see that differences in the policy impact between regions decrease substantially, when
vertical linkages are introduced in the model. Whereas without vertical linkages the standard
deviation of the simulated policy impact is 1.005 (left map), it decreases to 0.804 when we
introduce vertical linkages (right map). Also the amplitude of the simulated policy impact
across regions decreases (the minimum value increases from -0.22% to -0.04% of GDP, and
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Figure 4: Simulated impact of cohesion policy investment in transport infrastructure on real GDP in 2050,
percentage changes from the baseline. Left panel: without vertical linkages; right panel: with vertical
linkages.
the maximum value decreases from 4.57% to 3.80% of GDP. Hence, our results suggest that,
vertical linkages have the tendency to spread the positive growth impact from regions with
the highest intervention to other regions.
6. Conclusions
RHOMOLO v.2 contains two agglomeration forces (increasing returns to scale and
localised externalities) and two dispersion forces (costly trade and imperfect competition) in
a dynamic spatial general equilibrium model with endogenous location. Allowing households
and investments to move across regions, and allowing firms to source their inputs from other
firms inside or outside the region, the spatial distribution of economic activities is determined
endogenously and can be affected by policy intervention.
The distinction of goods, factors, firms, and households by location, and the incorporation
of trade costs in RHOMOLO can be used to capture a variety of issues in regional and
transport economics. The inclusion of a consistent capital market and the flexibility in
terms of the choice of asset ownership scheme in particular enables the model to be used for
the study of regional investment subsidies. Furthermore, the model can be connected to a
dynamic stochastic macroeconomic model, such as QUEST, or to a transport network model,
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such as TRANSTOOLS, to study the long-run dynamic effects of transport infrastructure
improvements.
Illustrative simulations suggest that EU labour mobility across EU regions can magnify
the home market effect and the market access effect. In contrast, the market crowding effect
seems to dominate the market access effect for capital mobility and vertical linkages. These
results are not surprising because the endogenous location mechanism of labour mobility
entails a strong additional agglomeration effect as compared to capital mobility: the lower
cost-of-living luring workers towards more agglomerated regions to enjoy higher real incomes
because of lower prices.
Turning to limitations, a general problem of the CGE approach is that almost all model
data is used for calibration, whereas very little data is left for testing the model. Hence, a
promising area for future research is to estimate dynamic spatial general equilibrium models
instead of calibrating them. In particular, the estimation and testing of large dynamic spatial
general equilibrium models, such as RHOMOLO, is still an open issue to be addressed in the
future.
Our results have important implications for future research. First, our simulations focused
on one endogenous channel of adjustment at the time because of the infeasibility of solving the
model, analytically or numerically, in presence of multiple asymmetric regions and multiple
endogenous channels. Hence, as presented in the present paper, numerical simulations may
be necessary to identify the impact of each agglomeration and dispersion forces on spatial
equilibrium of economic activities. Second, the RHOMOLO model shows that a careful
modelling of the spatial interactions between agents can prevent the system from reaching
corner solutions in spatial equilibrium. Finally, our results advocate more research to be
devoted to the uniqueness and stability of spatial equilibrium in empirically implemented
new economic geography models with multiple asymmetric regions and multiple endogenous
channels of adjustment. In this context, a particularly promising avenue for future research
is saddle path stability and local properties around the steady state.
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Appendix
Table 2: Simulation scenario construction: ECP expenditure on INF in 2014-2020 (Million Euro) and the
estimated impact in regions’ accessibility (percent).
Region EUR Tcost Region EUR Tcost Region EUR Tcost Region EUR Tcost
AT11 0.7 1.664 DEC0 2.6 1.506 GR25 51.0 2.507 PT11∗ 359.6 9.045
AT12 3.9 1.751 DED1 49.0 2.810 GR30 232.1 6.683 PT15 17.9 1.655
AT13 2.1 1.773 DED2 53.4 2.930 GR41 17.7 1.675 PT16∗ 210.3 5.820
AT21 1.1 1.552 DED3 26.8 2.236 GR42 16.2 1.659 PT17 111.5 3.668
AT22 2.0 1.641 DEE0 57.2 2.964 GR43 55.5 2.464 PT18∗ 53.2 2.418
AT31 1.7 1.612 DEF0 6.7 1.622 HU10 161.0 5.602 PT20∗ 31.4 1.587
AT32 0.7 1.549 DEG0 50.1 2.765 HU21∗ 148.1 5.301 PT30 30.7 1.638
AT33 1.9 1.536 DK01 1.9 1.470 HU22∗ 124.4 4.693 RO11∗ 126.0 4.119
AT34 0.6 1.493 DK02 1.6 1.452 HU23∗ 156.2 5.331 RO12∗ 114.1 3.782
BE10 1.3 1.455 DK03 1.6 1.478 HU31∗ 217.0 6.873 RO21∗ 199.6 5.538
BE21 2.2 1.480 DK04 1.5 1.454 HU32∗ 269.7 8.046 RO22∗ 139.4 4.220
BE22 2.9 1.490 DK05 0.7 1.420 HU33∗ 224.5 6.947 RO31∗ 160.0 4.711
BE23 1.1 1.431 EE00∗ 221.9 6.196 IE01 15.3 1.333 RO32 52.1 2.507
BE24 0.5 1.425 ES11 176.3 5.122 IE02 9.1 1.226 RO41∗ 114.5 3.801
BE25 1.6 1.434 ES12 25.7 1.905 ITC1 32.0 2.174 RO42∗ 79.8 3.120
BE31 0.8 1.452 ES13 8.6 1.529 ITC2 1.0 1.460 SE11 1.3 1.198
BE32 7.3 1.583 ES21 22.7 1.860 ITC3 10.0 1.644 SE12 2.6 1.215
BE33 3.5 1.512 ES22 4.9 1.457 ITC4 22.0 1.951 SE21 3.5 1.229
BE34 1.1 1.461 ES23 2.6 1.411 ITD1 2.8 1.548 SE22 2.4 1.261
BE35 1.5 1.461 ES24 24.5 1.886 ITD2 1.3 1.505 SE23 2.4 1.240
BG31∗ 65.6 2.943 ES30 28.4 1.971 ITD3 22.9 2.016 SE31 8.8 1.299
BG32∗ 64.9 2.904 ES41 55.4 2.557 ITD4 6.9 1.651 SE32 7.8 1.245
BG33∗ 65.3 2.895 ES42 45.0 2.308 ITD5 8.4 1.627 SE33 10.5 1.251
BG34∗ 73.5 3.050 ES43∗ 106.2 3.640 ITE1 27.4 2.045 SI01∗ 93.2 3.700
BG41∗ 84.0 3.322 ES51 78.3 3.105 ITE2 9.0 1.647 SI02 68.8 3.110
BG42∗ 105.9 3.781 ES52 105.5 3.645 ITE3 10.3 1.664 SK01 35.1 2.569
CY00 23.7 1.673 ES53 7.6 1.452 ITE4 41.4 2.353 SK02∗ 285.3 8.708
CZ01 69.1 3.737 ES61 407.3 9.936 ITF1 7.5 1.594 SK03∗ 267.9 8.227
CZ02∗ 137.0 5.381 ES62 57.2 2.580 ITF2 3.0 1.493 SK04∗ 356.8 10.222
CZ03∗ 150.9 5.436 ES63 1.9 1.335 ITF3∗ 339.7 9.023 UKC1 5.1 1.465
CZ04∗ 160.0 5.703 ES64 3.1 1.291 ITF4∗ 223.4 6.389 UKC2 6.5 1.492
CZ05∗ 203.2 6.780 ES70 122.8 3.272 ITF5∗ 30.3 2.113 UKD1 1.0 1.356
CZ06∗ 193.7 6.507 FI13 6.8 1.234 ITF6∗ 97.7 3.520 UKD2 1.4 1.394
CZ07∗ 176.8 6.152 FI18 5.2 1.252 ITG1∗ 297.5 7.782 UKD3 7.9 1.555
CZ08∗ 167.3 5.989 FI19 6.2 1.240 ITG2 33.3 2.054 UKD4 4.2 1.451
DE11 1.0 1.486 FI1A 7.0 1.200 LT00∗ 396.5 10.233 UKD5 4.8 1.474
DE12 0.9 1.460 FI20 0.1 1.126 LU00 1.2 1.199 UKE1 1.6 1.398
DE13 1.0 1.458 FR10 3.8 1.227 LV00∗ 278.9 7.445 UKE2 0.6 1.369
DE14 0.6 1.473 FR21 9.1 1.370 MT00 47.1 1.907 UKE3 2.2 1.418
DE21 4.2 1.591 FR22 11.2 1.403 NL11 1.2 1.464 UKE4 4.7 1.472
DE22 2.2 1.596 FR23 14.4 1.454 NL12 1.7 1.469 UKF1 0.7 1.386
DE23 2.1 1.592 FR24 5.6 1.254 NL13 1.3 1.479 UKF2 0.7 1.396
DE24 2.0 1.571 FR25 7.3 1.294 NL21 2.8 1.529 UKF3 0.5 1.382
DE25 2.6 1.569 FR26 10.9 1.390 NL22 4.0 1.536 UKG1 1.8 1.415
DE26 1.8 1.526 FR30 38.5 2.025 NL23 1.4 1.478 UKG2 4.1 1.468
DE27 3.5 1.557 FR41 16.8 1.555 NL31 0.9 1.469 UKG3 9.8 1.622
DE30 11.5 1.876 FR42 3.6 1.283 NL32 1.9 1.462 UKH1 2.8 1.454
DE41 29.6 2.252 FR43 4.9 1.290 NL33 3.3 1.492 UKH2 1.0 1.416
DE42 7.2 1.724 FR51 14.0 1.404 NL34 0.3 1.414 UKH3 2.7 1.465
DE50 1.0 1.496 FR52 18.9 1.482 NL41 2.9 1.491 UKI1 3.0 1.473
DE60 0.2 1.506 FR53 14.4 1.422 NL42 1.9 1.485 UKI2 4.0 1.502
DE71 2.7 1.523 FR61 21.7 1.555 PL11∗ 335.4 9.783 UKJ1 0.2 1.394
DE72 0.8 1.485 FR62 25.7 1.627 PL12 344.7 9.832 UKJ2 0.6 1.413
DE73 1.0 1.504 FR63 5.1 1.246 PL21∗ 447.6 12.453 UKJ3 0.6 1.402
DE80 50.4 2.705 FR71 19.8 1.556 PL22∗ 526.3 14.553 UKJ4 0.7 1.430
DE91 7.0 1.658 FR72 6.3 1.280 PL31∗ 351.4 9.849 UKK1 1.7 1.420
DE92 8.6 1.679 FR81 28.9 1.711 PL32∗ 352.5 9.955 UKK2 1.4 1.405
DE93 13.9 1.808 FR82 16.6 1.476 PL33∗ 189.0 6.273 UKK3∗ 16.3 1.737
DE94 6.9 1.595 FR83 2.6 1.166 PL34∗ 188.4 6.046 UKK4 2.9 1.425
DEA1 8.7 1.636 GR11∗ 77.9 3.148 PL41∗ 408.2 11.563 UKL1∗ 44.6 2.418
DEA2 4.8 1.541 GR12∗ 219.4 6.325 PL42∗ 221.1 6.947 UKL2 3.7 1.449
DEA3 3.1 1.508 GR13 14.9 1.770 PL43∗ 139.0 5.059 UKM2 4.6 1.419
DEA4 2.1 1.507 GR14∗ 80.2 3.210 PL51∗ 323.7 9.698 UKM3 15.2 1.667
DEA5 6.9 1.602 GR21∗ 47.2 2.464 PL52∗ 142.9 5.331 UKM5 0.8 1.310
DEB1 1.2 1.462 GR22 23.2 1.892 PL61∗ 283.7 8.456 UKM6 2.8 1.317
DEB2 0.5 1.438 GR23∗ 93.3 3.449 PL62∗ 219.8 6.780 UKN0 11.1 1.535
DEB3 1.7 1.481 GR24 24.8 1.956 PL63∗ 281.9 8.233
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the European Commission (2014) data. Notes: Aggregate Cohesion Policy expenditure on INF for the entire
2014-2020 period in Million EUR, Tcost: estimated reduction in transportation costs (weighted across all regions) in percent. ∗ indicates Less
Developed Regions.
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